The thing is, there are spontaneous reactions in nature. You can even observe several of them in a lab, so why wouldn't it be possible for the universe to be one such a reaction? No reason really, unless you choose to provide causation, be that in the form of a God, external force. or simply the reaction of whatever there is/was at the time to itself.
Molecular decay could be used as a model to how the universe began, if we are simply one of the cast off bits of the whole. But of course, this runs into the same issue only delayed a step; what made the previous particle? That is also one of my issues with religious figures, how can anything be time-less. It's an interesting idea, an quite possibly outside the realm of human explanation, which is why it would have to be a god, but does that really mean it could/does exist?
"Even the stars die out." -The Dragon

@Dresden

"Molecular decay could be used as a model to how the universe began, if we are simply one of the cast off bits of the whole."

What does this sentence mean?

''I don't know why you love Douglass so much since it belies your previous strong support for the Confederacy and your past defamatory statements against Lincoln and the abolitionist movement in the US.''

This is an outrageous lie. All I have ever said on the subject is that I believe that slavery was not the sole cause of the Civil War, pointing out that in my view tarrifs (particularly the Morrill tarrif) need to be considered as well. I challange you to come up with anything more I have said on the subject, if not an apology is in order.

well, as a molecule decays it gives off particulate radiation, neutrinos, leptons and other sub-atomic particles. Because of the miniscule mass of such particles, they are released at tremendous velocity. Now, I haven't worked on my particle physics in a while, but as of yet, humanity cannot observe within leptons, and while they are thought of as having no inner structure, it's quite possible that they do. So if the universe were in effect the "size" of one of these particles, from an outside observer, then it would make sense.
Honestly, the idea just popped into my head and I didn't think it through or anything before posting, so it may be completely irrational.

Yes, I see what you're saying and it's completely irrational : )

And, it still doesn't actually help anything, because at some point, there's a beginning.

@iPillage: The word "agnostic" kinda represents what you've described...

@ abge
And, it still doesn't actually help anything, because at some point, there's a beginning.

Do you perchance mean a ''First Cause?''

If by First Cause, you mean Aristotle's Primum Movens, then no. I suppose that's one possibility, but there are others. However, unless the universe is cyclic (and I've seen no evidence for this), there must be some beginning. I would not presume to know in what form.

@ Abge. Could you please expand on the ''other possibilities'' which you mention?

Moreover in my view, as infinity is not a number it is not actually a measure of anything. A cyclical infinite and eternal universe is a difficult proposition to justify.

No, I can't, because I'm not a theoretical cosmologist.

I'd agree that infinity is not a number, but I strongly disagree that it isn't a measure of anything. For instance: how many integers are there? An infinite amount.

Being cyclical and being infinite are very, very different things. I don't think either are the case, though.

Actually, being cyclical could well be the same as being infinite. There is a school of thought where all parallel lines meet at infinity and where infinity and negative infinity are essentially the same point in space making space 4 dimensionally spherical.

No, it can't. The boundary conditions are different.

Also, I think I just grasped one of the major rebuttals to Hume's Problem of Induction. This one comes from Karl Popper and you can read the essay I got it from here.
http://dieoff.org/page126.htm

Popper agrees with Hume that induction is necessarily always logically invalid. However where Hume argues that humans use some form of inductive reasoning through instinct or convention, Popper argues that the process which science uses is not induction, nor does it resemble induction in any meaningful way, superficial similarities notwithstanding. Induction attempts to reach valid conclusions by assuming that past experiences will repeat themselves. This is the point you take issue with. Popper claims that scientific knowledge has no claim to any such validity. In Popper's view all scientific knowledge is conjectural or hypothetical. In other words, the laws which science puts forth are not actually laws in the sense that they purport to accurately describe the ways in which things must act. Instead they are simply conjectures (often very well supported conjectures, but conjectures nevertheless) that are either more or less good, as the case may be at describing the world around us. If we use Popper's paradigm to view scientific knowledge then the classic problem of induction which your argument so heavily relies upon becomes irrelevant. It's an interesting perspective to be sure.

That was @ semck as well.

@Draug: you're describing projective (hyper)planes. It may be that the cosmological structure of the universe is like that, we don't know yet. As far as I know, the current cosmological observations render such a scenario unlikely, but not impossible.

@fulhamish: infinity is the measure of something. Either that, or infinity does not exist at all. Infinity and Cyclicity are different. In Draugnar's example they happen to agree, but this is merely coincidental. A eternal universe isn't very hard to justify, because there's no question like "how did it begin?" to be answered.

Thing is, scientific evidence (CMB, nucleosynthesis, Hubble's Law) proves the existence of a Big Bang, and rules out an eternal universe. So much for that.

@Warden: your idea isn't as rubbish as it sounds. It would be wise to avoid the scientific lingo if you don't know the exact meaning of each term, but that doesn't mean the idea is wrong.

The standard model particles could have inner degrees of freedom. The laws of physics governing those DOFs might give rise to the same complexity as in our own universe. In other words, a universe within a universe. If there is also some confinement principle at work, the inner DOFs could be largely decoupled from what happens outside. The physics within would then be completely oblivious to the outside universe. That is, until the outside tries hard enough and breaks confinement (as in a particle accelerator).

Let me clarify that I do not for a moment believe this is the case, but it is not an impossible scenario. It even allows for a scientific model of God!

@abge: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Projective_geometry

Read this, and I'm sure you'll understand what Draugnar is getting at, and why it is completely tangential to the point you want to make.

@bas

Thanks for the link. I think I see what Draug is saying now. But, I think we both agree that this scenario is unlikely.

Not sure. The Friedmann equations depend on two parameters: Lambda, the cosmological constant, and k, the Gaussian radius of curvature. If k is positive, we live in a projective space. I believe (but I honestly don't know) that current knowledge gives something like k=-0.2 Mpc^-2 with 0.4 Mpc^-2 uncertainty.

So k is probably negative, but positivity is not ruled out. Frustatingly, nothnig is ruled out.

"Thing is, scientific evidence (CMB, nucleosynthesis, Hubble's Law) proves the existence of a Big Bang, and rules out an eternal universe. So much for that."

That's not true at all. http://arxiv.org/PS_cache/arxiv/pdf/0712/0712.0571v1.pdf

Scientific evidence rpoves the Big Bang???? haaaa ha ha ha ha ha!! Not sure what the hell they teach in schools anymore, but it used to be proof came only when you could independently repeat and expirement....

so....who, exactly, has repeated the Big Bang expirement????

At best it is a theory. At worst....

@Mafialligator,

Thank you for the three new responses. Sorry for the delay in responding. I got quite a lot done today, which unfortunately required taking a break from webdip.

OK, so. First response first.

"There are an infinite number of possibilities as to why we live in an ordered universe, and it would be impossible to conceive of every single one. Your proposal that I attempt to run through every conceivable explanation and let you prove how it doesn't work as well as a Christian God is an exercise in futility."

I fear you have completely missed my point; probably my fault. I can be unclear in describing this stuff.

You refer to an infinite number of possibilities "why we live in an ordered universe." The problem is not why, it's whether, and the fact that in your worldview, one must conclude almost certainly not. Given that, the issue is not to "explain why we live in an ordered universe." The issue is why you're so peaceful in a worldview that implies the liklihood of iminent chaos and the impossibility of knowing anything.

As to going through the list, my point was that you had challenged me as to whether Christianity was the worldview you necessarily had to come to to avoid this. My point is, well, fine. Leave your current worldview for some other one, and then I'll help you see why that one isn't any better. What's not an option is for you to keep your present one.

"We'll never get through an exhaustive list, and even if somehow we did manage to get through every possibility that I am capable of conceiving of, we'd still never be able to get through any of the possibilities that are beyond the scope of what humans can conceive of."

Again, the point is not a theoretical enumeration of worldviews. The point is for you to have one where you can reason. If we really can't get through the list, then when we run out of time, you'd better take up Christianity. Otherwise you'll be left with an incoherent worldview.

Again, some undefined valid worldview somewhere-out-there does you no good at all. If it's not the one you actually believe in, then it doesn't explain to you why order is likely and reason is possible.

For example, Christianity can undergird reason, but you don't believe Christianity, so it's absolutely useless to you in explaining reason. So it is with all the many other (undefined) worldviews out there that might happen to help you out if you DID believe them.

"Your argument that you know the Christian God is necessarily the only being that could possibly be sustaining the universe, because the Bible says he is, and hey "Presto, the universe is sustained!" is frankly begging the question."

Well, in my epistemology, it is how I know things. Of course you don't accept what the Bible says, but I do, and believe it's the Word of God, so it would be very strange if I _didn't_ accept what it said.

"I'm not relying on some kind of inborn faith, I'm relying on the fact that I have been socially conditioned to expect the universe to remain fundamentally ordered,"

Social conditioning, of course, is little to rely on once you realize there's nothing behind it. It has nothing to do with whether the univeerse will really remain ordered.

"and I don't appreciate you telling me that I secretly believe in a god who I most definitely don't believe in. I'd appreciate it if you refrained from putting words in my mouth and beliefs in my head in future."

I do accept that you believe that you don't believe in God.

"And at any rate, were the universe to become fundamentally disordered at any moment, I would be completely unable to predict what the result would be. In fact the only contingency in which I will be able to make predictions about how anything behave is in the contingency that the universe remains fundamentally ordered, so I may as well keep at it, even if that may be proven wrong at any moment."

That is not true. As I already pointed out, if the universe happened to take a very strange but imaginable path (the now-tedious 747 example), and I happened to act on the assumption of that happening, it would work out very well; and certainly nothing in my mental equipment FORBIDS me from doing so.

The point is that, _if your worldview is true_, you're _already_ completely unable to predict the future. You're just getting lucky (much as in that situation) again and again; but that could change. In fact you should regard its iminent change as overwhelmingly likely.

"The fact of the matter is aside from the fact that the universe has, up till this point, remained fundamentally ordered, does not prove the existence of a Christian God."

Well, I did not claim so. As I said, the issue has nothing to do with its having been ordered up till now (though that is incredibly striking, certainly). It is whether I could continue to count on such.

Are you admitting that atheism destroys knowledge, then, and pledging to Islam? If so, we can discuss why Christianity is superior to that. List off all the worldviews you want where (you say) reason would be supported. The point remains, you still don't have any of them, and I do.

Incidentally, are you a materialist? I'm just curious. (Inter-message question, if you will).

Moving on,....

"Also @ semck - It occurs to me that really you're just using a specific version of the Trancendental argument for the existence of God,..."

Yes, that is correct.

"...for which there exist several rebuttals."

Aha! Bring them on then.

"The Hume-esque Skepticism of Induction is not universally held to be valid in philosophical circles. There are a number of philosophical responses which apparently make the Problem of Induction a nonsense, though I admit that I don't actually understand them. So lets leave them aside unless someone else does understand them and can explain them here."

Well, you do bring one up later, and I'll respond to that there. Otherwise, I have to say that I don't see this as much of a rebuttal at all. Many professional philosophers do still view the PoI as unresolved, of course. As for myself -- well, I'm sure I can't claim to have looked into every attempted rebuttal, but I have looked at several very mainstream ones, including Popper's, and I think they utterly fail, at least in responding to this particular problem. (Some of them redefine the issue in ways that aren't relevant here).

"Using Inductive Skepticism to prove that I secretly or unconsciously believe in God precludes the possibility that I may be using induction for entirely pragmatic reasons, even if I were aware that doing so was a logically invalid thing to do."

My statement that you do on some level believe in God was based on the fact that God says so in His Word (Romans 1, e.g.). Of course, you don't accept His Word, but you can understand, in any case, why in my world view I can say so.

As I've already pointed out, it's not pragmatic to go on using induction once one has realized there is no reason to think it is true. The problem, I suspect, frames itself for you very much as trying to figure out HOW you KNOW this to be true. I would be surprised if you are very seriously considering dropping a belief in the regularity of the world, rather than trying to figure out how it is you know the world will be regular. (Of course, this is speculation). What I am suggesting to you is that you DO know the world will be regular, and you KNOW you know, and it is this that is related to your supressed knowledge (on some level) of God.

"Even if I do grant that anyone who uses induction for any reason necessarily presupposes the existence of God (which I don't, again see point 2) I put it to you that that does not mean that God necessarily exists. Only that I presuppose his existence. I could very easily presuppose something which happened to be false. "

Perhaps, sure; but inasmuch as belief in God was required for _reason_, then argument, at least, would be at an end, and at the Christian position. Denying the position would entail denying reason and knowledge.

OK, on to post #3, on Popper. The problem with Popper is, his response basically completely sidesteps the problem of induction, or at least, it completely sidesteps the part that matters to this argument.

Implicit in Hume's original "problem of induction" were a couple of problems, which I've been lazily neglecting to distinguish. One was whether the world was regular, and the other, whether induction was a reliable way to predict regularities. (Obviously, if the answer to the first was no, the second would be irrelevant). These are often folded together, shorthand as it were.

The problem with Popper is he only really addresses the second issue. Popper's works are about the creation and testing of "models" of how the world works, and he says that falsifiability is key, rather than the inductive procedure of assuming the future will be like the past. The problem is, this completely sidesteps and discourages any real belief in your model -- rather than solve the problem, it impales itself on the dilemma.

That is, nothing in Popper's analysis actually supports the idea that there IS regularity in nature to model in the first place, and he rejects the possibility that you could ever decide that it _was_ likely, much as I've been suggesting. Nor does your "model" become more probable as it succeeds more and more tests -- for exactly the same reasons as before (it started out at 0% liklihood, and it will stay there forever).

"Induction attempts to reach valid conclusions by assuming that past experiences will repeat themselves. This is the point you take issue with."

It's true that the form of my argument before was directed to the inductive form of argument, but the conclusion is still fine.

By way of illustration -- OK. Justify now, as a Popperian, your knowledge that the sun will rise tomorrow.

Presumably, you will not mention the sun rising in the past this time (I know it was really yellowjacket before), since you're no longer an inductivist. But just what will you mention?

"It's a model that I'm assuming in order to falsify?" That totally fails to describe your actual mental state as an ordinary person believing the sun will rise; and moreover, it does nothing about your model's near-certain inaccuracy. That it may fail to be falsified may be gratifying, but that only leaves it around to be improbable another day. Once again, knowledge is destroyed; the assumption that there is any order to model a completely bare one made in the face of all liklihood and all sources of knowledge.

Apart from the specific form (where I listed the premises), then, the argument stays just as strong.

One of the really interesting things, by the way, and somewhat surprising to me, is that one can make all this about things being "probably irregular" very quantitative with surprising ease. Kolmogorov complexity, as I already briefly discussed in a prior post. It only becomes far more overwhelming once one passes to infinite situations.

"If we use Popper's paradigm to view scientific knowledge then the classic problem of induction which your argument so heavily relies upon becomes irrelevant."

On the contrary. If you use Popper's paradigm then you just embrace your despair and your inability to know anything to any probability at all. No longer will you be able to say you believe anything about the future with any support at all. Once again, your worldview flatly fails to deliver the knowledge (or even probable knowledge) of the future that you need in order to plan or do anything.

Once again, I do appreciate your serious engagement on these issues. I do not intend to be disrespectful, and hope I am not being so.

@Warden: Sure, any old thing could happen, as I say. The problem is that in a world where any old thing happens, one can't count on anything, or know anything.

See?

Regards.

OK. Justify now, as a Popperian, your knowledge that the sun will rise tomorrow. - I suppose, strictly speaking I can't. I'm OK with that.

Infinity is a fine concept for maths, but when you apply it to science it rather breaks dowm. For example, 1kg is as closed to infinity as 100000000 kg, so how can you describe an object of infinite wt in terms of infinity? Also, in terms of scientific conferences, how many cans of beer are there in an infinite # of six packs? If the answer is infinity * 6, that is happy days!

So we are stuck with a prime mover at the beginning, granted that even a cyclical universe must have such a singularity.

I love it when people say "maths"! It's so British sounding.

@Mafialligator:

Me:"OK. Justify now, as a Popperian, your knowledge that the sun will rise tomorrow."

You: "I suppose, strictly speaking I can't. I'm OK with that."

I see. So you admit that you are OK with a worldview in which your beliefs are utterly without foundation -- pure faith commitments based on nothing. I will certainly keep this in mind when you dare to ask anybody for reasons for anything in future threads.

''I love it when people say "maths"! It's so British sounding''

Hi Mafia, it is such a shame that the way I pronounce it is closer to Michael Caine than Hugh Grant. Otherwise I am sure that I would have had more success with your American girls!

'As Deepak Chopra taught us, quantum physics means anything can happen at any time for no reason.'--Professor Hubert J. Farnsworth

Doesn't this mean that atheism embraces the fact the the universe could do whatever at any moment?

After taking a second look at this before I post it, there's probably a lot of it I could've left out and still made my point, but as I am between classes, and don't have the time to fix it, so I'll just post the thing in its entirety.
@smeck Also, is it not expedient to plan on the Sun rising each day, simply because if you plan otherwise, then you have no reason to continue with your life? Giving yourself reason for existence is a vital need for a person of atheistic tendencies, so I would think that the argument is worthless.
Either the sun will rise again, or it won't. If it does, then you are prepared and you move on with your life; if not, then does it really matter if you were prepared or expecting it? Embracing a world view in which it is possible at any moment for the world to radially shift, does not at all mean that one would expect it to, simply because that is impractical. Take your 747 example, I could decide to act as though it would work, but even taking it as a possibility does not mean that I should act on it. Perhaps I should drop out of college because I believe that a meteor may manifest out of nowhere and strike the campus. Belief does not make it so, and belief that it is a possibility does not make it expedient to expect such radical changes in our universe.

Now, for argument, suppose God does not exist, and the universe can and does randomly change. Does a person's belief in God do anything to change that possibility? Of course not. But once again, it is simply impractical to go around expecting the universe to do this, so any sane person will act as though expecting the universe to remain constant. This allows for the use of induction for practical purposes, as well as eliminating the need for a supreme being to hold the universe constant.

As for why we should believe our own thoughts to be at all useful given a universe without a God? Why should we not? Once again, if we assume that God in fact does not exist, we cannot rely on him for a reason for human thought. However, if we assume that because human thought was not a planned action by a creator, does that make it any less real? I think therefore I am. If intelligible thought seems contingent on the existence of God, then that is merely because your mind is less open to other possibilities.
Apologies for the abrupt changes of topic, and probable ranting going on.

@Warden,

I don't think most atheists, nor indeed most non-atheists, view Deepak Chopra as a particularly good interpreter of Quantum Mechanics. In particular, while QM does have indeterminacy in it, it does predict rigidly defined probability distributions which, in the kind of numbers we're usually talking about with elementary particles and the like, lead to near-total determinacy (e.g. classical mechanics). This is a very far cry from true disorder.

"Also, is it not expedient to plan on the Sun rising each day, simply because if you plan otherwise, then you have no reason to continue with your life? Giving yourself reason for existence is a vital need for a person of atheistic tendencies, so I would think that the argument is worthless.
Either the sun will rise again, or it won't. If it does, then you are prepared and you move on with your life; if not, then does it really matter if you were prepared or expecting it? "

This is nice, except for one problem. The sun is just an example. So yes, it's true that if the sun doesn't rise again, you'll be dead, and so maybe you won't care. On the other hand, what about the case where the sun does rise, but everything turns to chaos around you on earth? Eating kills you instead of sustaining you; your school is gone when you show up there in the morning; your car goes forward in reverse instead of in drive, or runs on butter instead of on gas.

Just accepting the propositions "I will continue to be alive" don't actually make order in the REST of the universe, not depending on that, any more likely. Actually, it's also always possible that the sun wouldn't rise, but you would stay alive, because the atoms in your body would start moving in the right way without the need for external heat or sunlight.

"Giving yourself reason for existence is a vital need for a person of atheistic tendencies."

Well, that doesn't mean you can find it.

"Embracing a world view in which it is possible at any moment for the world to radially shift, does not at all mean that one would expect it to, simply because that is impractical. Take your 747 example, I could decide to act as though it would work, but even taking it as a possibility does not mean that I should act on it. Perhaps I should drop out of college because I believe that a meteor may manifest out of nowhere and strike the campus. Belief does not make it so, and belief that it is a possibility does not make it expedient to expect such radical changes in our universe. "

AHA! "Belief does not make it so." Exactly. So why do you act like one of your beliefs (induction/regularity) does make it so? And why do you prefer it over the other beliefs that also won't make it so? All of these beliefs are on an equal epistemelogical footing in your worldview, but you're strongly preferring one.

You say "even taking it as a possibility does not mean I should act on it." Then why should taking continued order as a possibility mean you should act on that? You can't distinguish them for me.

Also, you continue to speak of "impractical," but I've pointed out before that it's only "practical" to continue to assume nature is regular if nature is, in fact, going to keep being regular.

"Now, for argument, suppose God does not exist, and the universe can and does randomly change. Does a person's belief in God do anything to change that possibility? Of course not."

No, if God did not exist, reason would be impossible, and we could not change that.

But then you go on to talk about "practical" again.

"As for why we should believe our own thoughts to be at all useful given a universe without a God? Why should we not?"

Because those own thoughts tell us that they are absurd and improbable. See all of the above. In the event of no God, there is zero probability that my car will start when I turn the key. So just why is it useful to assume it will and turn the key?

(You could say, "Well, because at least then something MIGHT happen." But something might happen if I DON'T turn the key. Maybe it will start ONLY if I don't turn the key. If that is true, THAT is what would be useful to assume).

"Once again, if we assume that God in fact does not exist, we cannot rely on him for a reason for human thought."

No, but if God does not exist, there can be no reason for human thought at all, and no rational hope of it being worthwhile.

"However, if we assume that because human thought was not a planned action by a creator, does that make it any less real?"

Not less real -- just completely meaningless and futile.

"If intelligible thought seems contingent on the existence of God, then that is merely because your mind is less open to other possibilities. "

No, it's because other possibilities are demonstrably absurd and self-defeating.

"Apologies for the abrupt changes of topic, and probable ranting going on."

Not at all; it was an interesting and on-point response. Thanks.

Regards.

Putin writes
Wilberforce also established a slave colony in Sierra Leone, euphemistically called an "apprenticeship program". People there were bought and sold and worked for no money.

http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/belief/2010/aug/03/wilberforce-slavery-sierra-leone

What an excellent reference he supplies. Here are the concluding paragraphs from the article he references:

''What are we to make of it all? No interpretation that involves Wilberforce being corrupt, or insincere in his abolitionism, can possibly hold water. Vast amounts of his private letters and even privater journals are publicly available, and they reveal a man of extraordinary integrity and an implacable and lifelong (if slightly sentimental) hatred of slavery.

The key I think is that the apprenticeship system was explicitly authorised in the 1807 Abolition Act. Wilberforce told Thompson, "I wish I had time to go into particulars respecting the difficulties which forced us into acquiescing in the system of apprenticing". Which is tantalising, but also suggests that Wilberforce had made a political decision to support it as a government policy.

My theory is that Wilberforce and the Clapham sect believed that the Abolition Act would not get through the House of Lords without the apprenticeship clause, and once it was passed felt duty bound to support the system against Thompson's maverick actions.

But if so, and if Wilberforce was right that without apprenticeship the abolition bill would not have been passed, then it follows that he made the right choice to support it. Before abolition, 40,000 African people each year were being made slaves by the British. After abolition, several hundred of them a year were still ending up as slaves in Freetown.

It is a bitter irony, and a disappointment, but it does seem that Wilberforce was faced with a choice between two evils, and chose the less.''

One wonders again about Putin's use of referencing. it is all a little unfortunate and I feel a little guilty about drawing attention to it yet again.