"really ghostmaker? you think regulation under a REPUBLICAN president caused this recession. Prove it. This should give me a chuckle or two"
I do.
Firstly, this was not a republican president in the normal sense. Bush cannot be described as anti-regulation. He introduced the Sarbanes-Oxley Act which increased regulation; even with scandals such as Enron, this represents a deviation from the normal path of Republican thinking, and also penalises those who do business legitimately. He also pushed for new regulation for Freddie Mac and Fanny Mae: http://www.nytimes.com/2003/09/11/business/new-agency-proposed-to-oversee-freddie-mac-and-fannie-mae.html
Bush was not, therefore, your standard Republican- coming after 8 years of Democrat rule, you'd have thought he'd have had rather larger bonfire, wouldn't you. We have, and had, a mix of free markets and regulation. That is undeniable, regardless of the colour worn by the president, and it is vital to ask which part failed.
There are a few aspects of regulatory error that caused everything to be built so high and then fall like a stack of cards:
Firstly, the setting of interest rates is balmy. In communist Russia, the price of bread was set by a group of men sitting around the table. They invariably got it wrong. Normally too low, resulting in shortages, but sometimes too high, causing surpluses to be made. Bread is much simpler than interest rates, so we shouldn't be surprised that they get it wrong.
In 2003 the Fed lowered interest rates to 1%, with inflation at 3 or 4%. In other words, the real interest rate is negative, you are paid to borrow money *even if you don't actually make a profit on the investments you make with it*.
This means that everyone borrows money, often buying homes. This tendency is amplified by the housing policy in the United States. Every President, Republican or Democrat, since FDR has wanted to increase home ownership. Mortgages have been subsidised; banks have been encouraged to lend money to people who clearly couldn't afford it just for political favours. Bush was successful in increasing home ownership from 65% to 70% in the US.
An ever increasing demand for homes results in an ever increasing price. It was so persistent, since through any downturn the governments and central banks pumped money into the economies, that people thought that houses were a sure fire investment. They believed that you could never make a loss on them, and therefore you could never make a loss on a mortgage.
The logic banks then made was sound- houses are guaranteed profit, so there is very little risk, so lets leverage as much as possible to maximise gain. This would have been okay if it wasn't based on a faulty premise. Houses were only guaranteed profit for as long as the interest rate kept on dropping and staying well below inflation, and that was unsustainable because low interest rates cause inflation, which would eventually lead to disaster.
I'll pause briefly in the general narrative to strengthen the point. Things weren't that simple. If the above description was the whole case, only banks lending to American home owners would be in real trouble. The difficulty is that the regulatory restrictions on leverage meant that people tied webs around themselves so that they could take more risk. The logic above, which anyone would come to unless they were avid fans of Austrian economics (and the years of uninterrupted growth made Austrian economics look at a glance to be dead wrong- this monetary policy appeared to work), meant that 'risk' didn't appear to anyone to be risky.
The addition system used to calculate how much capital the bank actually had was like this, under the recourse rule (more regulation): an AA- or AAA-rated asset-backed security had a 20% risk rate, cash had a 0% risk and a personal mortgage had a 50% risk rate.
In a free market, there isn't much reason for buying the AA or AAA mortgage backed bonds. If you are looking for safety, go for the governments' bonds etc. but if you want yield, go for the mortgages and cut out the middle man. But nobody wants to actually have mortgages, because the counting system means that you can't have as many of them. Far better to get mortgages, sell them to somebody else, and then buy different mortgages as an AA or AAA package. Then your own assets count as 20% risk, not 50%, and you can do more business.
So we see that regulation has both (a) directly encouraged reckless personal borrowing, which has (b) encouraged come-what-may investment in houses and mortgages (which are secured by the house, the price of which is rising) and (c) created a very tight web of interactions by making that the way to get maximum leverage.
Then, from about 2005 to 2006, interest rates were increased by the Fed from 1% to 5.25% in what I think is the quickest rise in interest rates in US history. Suddenly the following happens:
People who had flexible rate mortgages can't pay them.
Banks start making losses on people who have fixed rate mortgages.
People stop buying houses.
Therefore, house prices go down, meaning that banks repossessing homes from those entering bankruptcy still don't recoup their losses. Banks are now loosing money on all the mortgages that they were led to believe were safe by the way regulation was set up and the effects of the way it was set up. Many to all banks have these mortgages, but nobody knows how many or whether they come from institutions that are unsafe or not because of the web that had been created by the pass the parcel game that had resulted from the twin factors of believing you couldn't make a loss on a mortgage and the way that regulation encouraged it as a way of increasing the leverage you could have. This lack of knowledge about which banks actually had a problem meant that investors assumed that all banks had a problem and the plug was pulled, people went on the defensive as bank shares proceeded to plummet, reducing spending and loosing confidence. Banks realising how much risk they had stopped lending more money, so credit froze and so did business. Consumption had fallen, the means of production, credit, had dried up, and a recession resulted.
It is easy to blame greedy bankers, because we don't intuitively understand that the lending of money is the fuel, not the load in the motor of our economy. It is easy to point to the fact that there was a big financial industry making loads of money which collapsed, and say that it was their fault, but that doesn't answer the question: Why was things so obviously *not beneficial to anyone* as people buying houses they couldn't afford, investing in projects that were in real terms breaking even or loosing to inflation, lending money to the people who were doing these things, why was that profitable in a free market? There was no reason why they would be in a free market, it was because there was regulation, because the market was not free, that a game was made in which they were profitable.
The fact is ultimately this: regulation changes the rules of the economic game (which I must emphasise isn't zero-sum, but that's another misconception), and nobody can predict what effect that has on the game. We introduce many rule changes at once to a massive playing board, with no idea how everything will interact. It is like playing chess on a single, enormous board with nearly 7 billion players, each with several sets of chessmen , and then restricting the number of moves people can make, with the specific aim to increase the number of pawn promotions happening. The fact is, nobody can hope to predict what is going to happen, let alone control the outcome by setting the rules, so lets go with the principle of free trade- so the vast majority of the time everyone in a trade benefits, as being the guarantor that most of the time when a house is built, or a jumper knitted or a loan lent, it is not stacking up a pile of cards that will fall down, bringing our world with them.
Let's put our faith in the fact that most people are responsible most of the time, so will not default on payments, will not fail to deliver a product, as the basis of our economy; and let's not put our faith in groups of suit-wearing men around tables to make universal decisions as to how to improve the rules, because when they inevitably get it wrong, everyone, not just the few who are irresponsible, suffers greatly as we have seen.