The Northern Front concerns Scandinavia; and it is perhaps the most neutral, as it causes no immediate harm or opposition to the provinces of each Great Power. The Jutland Gambit compliments this desire, allowing diplomatic, tactical, and provincial gains—Norway and Sweden—and involves F(Kie)-Den, A(Ber)-Kie, and A(Mun)-Ruh in Spring, 1901. In Fall, 1901, F(Den)-Ska, A(Kie)-Den, and A(Ruh)-Hol, allowing an attack on Sweden and diplomatic leverage with England and Russia while still remaining completely neutral.

The Eastern Front concerns Russia—Baltic Sea, Prussia, Silesia, Warsaw, and perhaps Sweden by extension—and asserts early intentions and ambitions, that being to make gains in Russia: the Western Front must be tucked away in neutrality and disinterest. The Barbarossa Opening is the most aggressive, and it involves F(Kie)-Bal, A(Ber)-Pru, and A(Mun)-Sil, giving an anchor into Warsaw. A more modest approach involves less folly: F(Kie)-Den and A(Ber)-Pru, which works better with support from Austria-Hungary in Galicia.

The Southern Front involves Austria-Hungary and/or Italy, but never both at once—for it is always vital to make friends with those who can affect targeted affairs: that in pairing with him, he may help achieve that which is desired. One possible opening involves F(Kie)-Den, A(Ber)-Mun, and A(Mun)-Tyr or A(Mun)-Boh: all other fronts must be played off between those concerning them.

And the Western Front concerns France and/or England (but usually France). (This is perhaps the most traditional front.) Neutrality is difficult to maintain when pursuing this front, and it is imperative to seek support from the Great Power who boarders the one being attacked: if France, England supports; if England, France supports. Belgium is a prize that can be offered as a bribe to the Great Power who accepts to aid the attack. In this fashion, it is wiser to never contest or try to contest Belgium—for it is better to use it as a bargaining tool, which others must contest to have—so that it is more likely for them to see the other as a bigger threat for wanting to take it: it often occurs that the competitors for a bribe see other competitors as bigger threats than the one who offered the bribe in the first place. Thus, an altered Schlieffen Plan can be proposed: F(Kie)-Den and A(Ber)-Kie, leaving A(Mun) to hold, which favours neither France or England in the gaining of Belgium.