Translation is a bitch. Point taken. Can you imagine that most of my friends read Harry Potter *in Dutch*?

It depends on your ethical theory. A utilitarian philosopher would probably condone euthanasia (given the right circumstances), a Kantian would probably do too (but I don't understand Kant enough to be sure). Others, most notably divine command theorists, don't.

It is also closely connected to the question what makes human life valuable. Is it experience of happiness, fullfilling wishes, or is human life in itself a valuable concept?

This is a useful ethical debate. It hasn't really anything to do with the metaphysical theist-deist-atheist-agnostic debate. When discussing ethics, please leave god out of it!

@basvanopheusden,

Umm, hello? I didn't say anything about 1-10, I said a COIN, which has TWO sides. That's why it would be 50/50. If we were picking an online random number generator and letting it pick a number between one and TWO, then my solution would be correct, and your bet would be fair. (I still wouldn't do it, because I don't take fair bets -- only unfair ones that are in my favor. Call it risk-aversion).

Your point is completely ridiculous.

For a number between 1 and 10, I would have to assign 1/10 to each number (including 4), so I'd have only a 10% chance of winning. The bet would only be fair if I was going to win $9 if I won, and you were going to win $1.

@Draugnar, Ah, interesting point. It's true that if one just assumes a generic God, then he could indeed do any old thing. But if one believes in (say) the Christian God, then there are some clear parameters of things He would and wouldn't do, based on His promises, etc. And yes, of course, He could always work miracles, but the parameters in which those might happen are also roughly sketched.

@orathaic,

"the count is correct, but the analogy fails on the assumption that tails is a possibility."

Well yes, because I don't know if it is or not, so I have to count bare possibilities. You go on to discuss weighted coins, etc., but that all assumes induction is true. For a weighted coin to work, physics has to be in place, e.g. If I know nothing but that I'm getting a sequence of H's and T's, and nothing else at all, then I can't infer anything about future probability from past probability, and while "possibility" may be a concept at work in the mechanism that is generating the string, I don't have access to that, so I can't assume it.

"But even your example assumes that there is a regularity to the process of flipping a coin."

No it doesn't. Only that it always generates a head or a tail.

"Our best estimate for a chaotic universe would still be to assume a 'regular' universe, but with some perturbation. "

Not at all. Take any subset of four-dimensional space, label one axis time, and say that there is a mass at a particular point of spacetime if and only if that point is in the subset. Then for a random subset, you have an extremely chaotic universe with no laws at all. It is an easy counting argument to see that almost all subsets of 4-space cannot be described by laws of any kind at all. (There are only countably many universes that can be described by laws, but 2^c subsets of R^4, where c is the continuum).

"I'm pretty sure you can build a system of knowledge on an assumption, and that non-atheists do the same. How can you claim this 'destroys knowledge' when any alternative system of knowledge has the same basis?"

Because the assumption (induction, here) is a bare assumption that does not comport with the rest of the world view. If you take bare atheism, it tells you that there is no reason to assume induction, and we could never know it was even probable (even if it was true). So if you then add an assumption of induction, it's already been implied that this assumption is completely uncorrelated to actual truth -- it is no more likely to be true than its negation. You can of course assume anything you want, but there is no way to distinguish that assumption from any other IN TERMS OF LIKLIHOOD TO BE TRUE.

"No, you can't count the number of possible universes where no regularity ensues. By the same virtue you can't count the number of possible universe where the laws hold, because in both cases you don't have any way of knowing how many of them there are. "

Sure I can -- there are uncountably many of the former, and at most countably many of the latter. Of course, there's only ONE of the latter if you mean where the laws of physics WE KNOW hold. (This, I guess, is not quite true given the indeterminacy of QM, but it is close enough to true not to change the calculation).

"You can't claim any knowledge of universes where this regularity requirement is dropped. "

Well, we've already discussed two of them -- the gold-in-pockets one, and the gold-under-bed one. That's already one more than there are regular universes.

"If regularity at some point fails then we can start trying to live in such a world, but until that point any such efforts will produce less."

The question is, does an atheistic world view actually provide justification for believing in the truth of this assumption, or even the probable truth? No. Therefore, again, it is only useful if it turns out to be true, and you don't know that.

You can keep ASSERTING that, but the point remains, it is not useful in general to assume something false, and we don't know if our assumption of regularity is true, even with positivie probability. Can you provide a justification for the likely TRUTH of this proposition from within a materialistic worldview? Answer: no. So what you'll do is just continue to assert that it's "useful," even though that begs the question. Please provide me with the justification I request.

"The result of actions in these two cases are distinguishable. "

But I don't know that yet. I don't know what tomorrow will bring, so why should I assume it will be regular? (You may say "because it will be useful to assume that", but that's not true if tomorrow turns out not to be regular).

"if i bet that there will be regularity i can take actions which i think will benefit me.

if my bet is wrong then it doesn't matter actions i have taken because all actions are equally unpredictable. "

Nice try, but it doesn't work. The same would be true if you made any other predictable bet. For example, you could bet that you'll make a million in gold if you run to the top of the LM steps. So why not do that?

You haven't yet distinguished that case. That, too, is a prediction. It's just not true that (arbitrarily assumed) regularity is the only way to make predictions. We can assume whatever we want to about the future and then act on that basis.

"There is no basis for decision making without the assumption of regularity."

True, but the assumption of regularity only provides such a basis because we really believe it is true. If it were probably false, or of indeterminate truth, it would not provide such a basis either.

"Alternatively i can deny the concept of free-will"

How would that solve anything? Free will has nothing to do with this one way or the other. That's just another regularity (one way or the other) that might end tomorrow.

@Leif 'So "Does God exist or not?" is in the same category as "Is the natural world all there is?" One is held up as fact, while the same people holding it conveniently ignore the fact that their position is underpinned by a belief system, at the same time calling the other side "ignorant" for holding a belief system.'

sure, those two questions are in the same category, but that isn't the same as saying ID/YEC should not be taught in science classes.

The question of whether religion should be taught in public schools is one thing, and a separate question can be asked, 'should science be taught in public schools'. Answer how you will, but science does NOT claim that the natural world is all there is, it merely claims that the natural world is all that science can test. Thus it is a category of things which can be agreed upon by all. (ie verified and tested by anyone)

This is why scientists would claim that science SHOULD be taught in public schools, without including non-scientific theories (ID/YEC)

These are not scientific theories.

It is entirely possible to test whether the earth is 4.6 billion years old or 6-10 thousand. Make predictions based on these tests and verify that each time they are done (or new better tests are thought up) they continue to be reinforced (or disputed and slightly modified) If you assume something other than natural causes, it is NOT possible to distinguish between YEC and Last Thursdaysim, or between ID and FSM - thus you can conclude that a 'science' class should teach evolution in biology, 4.6 billion year old earth in geology, and 13.7 billion year old universe in cosmology.

A comparative belief system class should teach YEC vs LT, ID vs FSM, and let the scientists (with their assumptions about natural causes) alone.

'Drop the double standard. I can respect you for holding a belief system that says the natural world is all there is'

it is no double standard. The arguement is simple, IF you want to teach science, then teach science - this assumes natural causes for all natural phenomena - if you want to teach something else, then do it in a separate class which doesn't make this assumption.

@semck 'Since we have no reason to assign greater probability to any of them, we have to assign equal probability to them all. (The principle of ignorance. That's just how probability works).'

...and since you are assigned probabilities without reason, i can legitimately claim you are being unreasonable in your arguement.

'...If I know nothing but that I'm getting a sequence of H's and T's, and nothing else at all, then I can't infer anything about future probability from past probability'

that's the point, if you know nothing at all then you know nothing at all. however, if you make an assumption, then you can make a prediction.

Now every time your prediction is correct then you have reinforced your reasons to think that it was correct in the first place. Of course it is still an assumption, but without making an assumption you can predict nothing, not a 50/50 chance of the next coin, nothing. As you said, you know nothing.

i said: "Our best estimate for a chaotic universe would still be to assume a 'regular' universe, but with some perturbation. "

you said: 'Not at all.'

but you're wrong, because ANY other model/estimate gives us 1/∞ chance of being accurate, which is 0.

in your example, ALL models are effectively wrong, but that wasn't one in which there was no regularity, it was one where space was always 4-d and mass was always well-defined. You can't assume such a countabley infinite set of universe exist if there is no regularity.


i said :"You can't claim any knowledge of universes where this regularity requirement is dropped. "

you said :'Well, we've already discussed two of them -- the gold-in-pockets one, and the gold-under-bed one. That's already one more than there are regular universes.'

The fact that we have discussed two irregular universes, and one regular one, doesn't mean that the number of irregular ones (or probability of them existing) is twice that of the regular ones.

There could be uncountably infinitely many regular universes aswell.

Just assume that you are trying to count the number of regular universes and the Pi is the only difference between each regular universe, then start counting them at Pi = 0, and go up for all Pi a Real Number.

Now we have uncountably infinite Regular universes. Compared with uncountably infinte iRegular ones. Somehow from here you claim that there is some way of knowing that one is more likely to be in a iRegular universe than a regular one.

'The question is, does an atheistic world view actually provide justification for believing in the truth of this assumption'

I could similarly question does the christian world view actually provide justification for believing that God will always be all-loving. So what is your point?

'So what you'll do is just continue to assert that it's "useful," even though that begs the question.'

it does not beg the question. I admit i can't know (sceptic) I now have to decide how to live my life.

I have two choices, make an assumption and live my life, make no assumption and have no way to determine how i should make decisions.

if my aim is to determine how i should live, then the arguement from usefulness is all that is needed.


'Nice try, but it doesn't work. The same would be true if you made any other predictable bet. For example, you could bet that you'll make a million in gold if you run to the top of the LM steps. So why not do that?'

because if i make this assumption (that is without any assumption of regularity) then it has to compete with all other iRegular assumptions for prediction.

I can't know which to assume. Thus i can't decide how to act (ie whether to go to LM or not) because anything is possible. That single assumption is that regularity is wrong AND LM gold will appear. To make this assumption i have to pick between all possible future cause (as i pointed out, with the second exmaple of the gold ending up under my bed) Without the assumption of regularity each iRregular solution is equally likely/unlikely.

Thus i can't act at all.

'We can assume whatever we want to about the future and then act on that basis.' - i disagree with you there.

We are human and not capable of making any assumptions we want. You seem to be assuming some ideal thinking machine with infinite states.

lastly: 'How would [denying free-will] solve anything?'

We are thus animals constrained to act based on our environment. We have brains which are able to simulate/model the world around us.

There are many models we can make. The model - perhaps best described as a belief system or world view - can be used to help guide our actions, IF it is capable of making accurate predictions.

That is all.

Can you repeat your position?
As i understand it
1) the assumption of regularity is at odds with the world-view of a materialist.
2) it is a belief system (contrary to what someone else said)

I've agreed with you on 2) and you haven't shown what me any contradiction in 1)

Science doesn't ask why. It is the role of science to ask how. For example the fundamental question in Physics is "How do things work?" It is the role of philosophy to ask why. So "why does the universe exist?" is not a scientifically answerable question for it is completely subjective. There will never be any objective evidence for the existence or non-existence of God. Therefore the attempt to debate it in a scientific way is fallacious from the start for both sides of the argument. God can only be an individual experience. It cannot be shared and thus the fundamental fallacy behind all religion.

God can only be an individual experience?

really? on what do you base that claim?

I entirely disagree because it is not something which fits with my definition of God.

Exactly, you assert your disagreement based on, "my definition of God" thus you have proven my point the here by asserting that you have a definition of God and imply that it is not the same as mine. Thus all definitions of God are subjective to the individual defining it. Now many people may share basically the same definition of God, yet consensus is not science. It is socratic philosophizing. When the socratic method of consensus is used to replace evidence it is called science by majority opinion or pseudo science.

Look I am not saying God doesn't exist. I love God desperately. And as a trained scientist I understand the limitations of the scientific method. It only asks "How", never "Why".

just a pair of points:
@situation: "Can you prove that theory to be false?"
Actually you can't, and that's exactly why it can't be science. A science theory must be fallible so that it makes sense to make experiments to see if it's false or not necessarily false (you can never prove a science theory true). A bit of Karl Popper here can be useful.

@Meher Baba: there's not such a thing called "scientific method".

@Meher, yes, i pointed that out in the last page of posts, where someone suggested not thinking about science in social policy.

Science can inform us how to do things, but not why. But that doesn't mean it should be ignored in discussions of social policy, we should be informed by the how in order to illuminate the discussion.

never-the-less, i claim that God is the one common experience. By definition.

Of course since i'm not talking about what you, (probably) talk about when you use the word God, that's not the point. I make the claim that we have a shared experience. An it is God.

@ orathaic I completely agree with you in that sense of what I think you mean and could go further to show how your definition of God is not in disagreement with individual experience. Perhaps our initial disagreement is more an issues of a lack of shared terminology than anything else. I will post more later. Cheers.

@ principians Well that is not what every physics professor I ever studied under believed. There a basic method to doing science.

maybe it's true that there's "basic method" to doing physics (which I doubt in spite of the general belief you mention).
But to have a "physics method" is far from having a "scientific method"

there are several different methods employed within science.

in some sciences observation is used without experimentation, usually where experimentation can't be done due to expense or lack of resources (replicating the big bang for example - though in some sense we're trying to replicate big bang like conditions on a smaller scale in the LHC - biggest machine ever built - but it is not the same)

"Why" questions are pointless, invented questions that have no meaning. The religious are great at inventing puzzles that do not need to be resolved. Like for example: what is the purpose of the universe? The only real questions are how questions.

@orathaic "...and since you are assigned probabilities without reason, i can legitimately claim you are being unreasonable in your arguement."

I have no idea what that means. Who said I assigned probabilities without reason? I am following the correct practice of probability theory.

"'...If I know nothing but that I'm getting a sequence of H's and T's, and nothing else at all, then I can't infer anything about future probability from past probability'

"that's the point, if you know nothing at all then you know nothing at all. however, if you make an assumption, then you can make a prediction."

Well, fine, but if your assumption is based on nothing, your prediction is worthless.

"Now every time your prediction is correct then you have reinforced your reasons to think that it was correct in the first place. Of course it is still an assumption, but without making an assumption you can predict nothing, not a 50/50 chance of the next coin, nothing. As you said, you know nothing."

No you haven't! That's a massive fallacy. Things don't become rational because they chance to be true. They are either justified or not beforehand.

Moreover, again per Hume's argument, no amount of success can lend even a whit of support to the hypothesis that the future will continue to be ordered, and therefore, not a whit of support to any prediction that it will be.

(We're talking predictions here. Predictions that come true are useless by then -- they're past predictions. We're looking for reasons to give them credence beforehand).

"i said: "Our best estimate for a chaotic universe would still be to assume a 'regular' universe, but with some perturbation. "

you said: 'Not at all.'

but you're wrong, because ANY other model/estimate gives us 1/∞ chance of being accurate, which is 0."

Yes, that's precisely my point. Including the regular one.

"in your example, ALL models are effectively wrong, but that wasn't one in which there was no regularity, it was one where space was always 4-d and mass was always well-defined. You can't assume such a countabley infinite set of universe exist if there is no regularity. "

Umm, sure I can. I mean, yeah, I don't know that 4 and mass will stay around, but that only adds MORE possible universes, making the probability of order even worse. If you increase the denominator, you decrease the probability. And none of the non-4 universes would be ordered (since I think we'd both agree, dimension changing would count as a breakdown of all observed order), so that would decrease the probability of order. You might say I was calculating an upper bound. Of course, since it turned out to be zero, I was also calculating the actual probability.

"The fact that we have discussed two irregular universes, and one regular one, doesn't mean that the number of irregular ones (or probability of them existing) is twice that of the regular ones."

Well, no, but it means that it's MORE. You keep saying (infra) that there are all these possible regular universes? How do you figure? REGULAR universes are highly constrained. They have to keep having the sun come up, electrons behave a certain way, etc., etc. The parameters for possible regular universes are very few compared with those for irregular ones. They're basically determined completely (whatever the laws of physics have been so far, they have to stay the same, and that determines the universe -- modulo only QM randomness).

"There could be uncountably infinitely many regular universes aswell."

Again... how do you figure? We already know what the regular one looks like.

"Just assume that you are trying to count the number of regular universes and the Pi is the only difference between each regular universe, then start counting them at Pi = 0, and go up for all Pi a Real Number."

I have no idea what this means.

But, assuming we did have uncountably many regular universes, there are still, yes, ways of talking about the probability of an uncountable set in another uncountable set, and the regular universes would still have probability zero. For example, there are uncountably many continuous functions on the interval [0,1], and uncountably many functions on [0,1], but the continuous functions are nowhere dense in the set of functions, meaning roughly that they have probability zero of being chosen at random. So it is in every situation where one gives some kind of orderedness property among a total set of items.

"I could similarly question does the christian world view actually provide justification for believing that God will always be all-loving. So what is your point?"

Sure of course. That's part of the definition of the Christian world view, and in that world view, we are also able to know such things, because God (who is all-Truthful) told us and made us able to know.

"it does not beg the question. I admit i can't know (sceptic) I now have to decide how to live my life.

I have two choices, make an assumption and live my life, make no assumption and have no way to determine how i should make decisions.

if my aim is to determine how i should live, then the arguement from usefulness is all that is needed. "

But again, it's NOT USEFUL unless it's true. There are PLENTY of algorithms you could use that would be useful if they were true. I promise that if you believed that saying "Hocus Pocus" would put a billion dollars in your bank account right now, and never again, you'd say it, even if it contradicted the idea of order. You just don't because you don't believe it's true.

"because if i make this assumption (that is without any assumption of regularity) then it has to compete with all other iRegular assumptions for prediction. "

Right.... and so does the prediction of regularity.

"We are human and not capable of making any assumptions we want. You seem to be assuming some ideal thinking machine with infinite states."

No it's true, we do have to assume regularity. That doesn't go to whether it's rational to do so, though, or whether knowledge is possible.

Knowledge is not possible in an atheistic world view precisely because it is all just arbitrary assumption. An instinct doesn't make knowledge.

"There are many models we can make. The model - perhaps best described as a belief system or world view - can be used to help guide our actions, IF it is capable of making accurate predictions."

Sure, but we can never know if it will be for another day.

"Can you repeat your position?
As i understand it
1) the assumption of regularity is at odds with the world-view of a materialist.
2) it is a belief system (contrary to what someone else said)"

I would say, for 1), that regularity is completely unknowable to an atheist, so there can be no knowledge or reasoning, only assumption. And there is no way to distinguish assumptions that has anything to do with their actual truth.

You say your assumption is useful. OK, fine. I disagree that it is, if it's probably false, but even so, useful doesn't mean true, so you have no principled way to criticize anything anybody believes for the same reason. Maybe somebody else believes science is evil and should be shut down, and they find that belief useful to them. You have no way to criticize this. It's the same epistemology you use. So ultimately there is just no knowledge at all.

@semck88: "There is absolutely no reason supporting an atheist's belief that tomorrow WILL be the same as past days, that the sun will rise tomorrow. "

The laws of physics?

"Sure of course. That's part of the definition of the Christian world view, and in that world view, we are also able to know such things, because God (who is all-Truthful) told us and made us able to know."

nice piece of circular logic there.

"But again, it's NOT USEFUL unless it's true. There are PLENTY of algorithms you could use that would be useful if they were true."

but if my one is not true then not other algorithm can be distinguished from the other, thus i have no way to choose between them. This is precisely the point i'm trying to get at.

"I would say, for 1), that regularity is completely unknowable to an atheist, so there can be no knowledge or reasoning, only assumption. And there is no way to distinguish assumptions that has anything to do with their actual truth."

But all things are unknowable to a sceptic, and this that doesn't require that we be atheistic nor theistic.

You say the assumption is probably false, and i say you have no way of knowing what the probability is. Your assigning of probabilities without knowledge is without rationality at all.

Very good, there is no knowledge at all without making some underlying assumptions.

So we're both sceptics. I'm fine with that, but i don't see why you take this to be a problem with atheism/materialism.

You can underline your knowledge with the basic idea that God always tells the truth, and derive all your knowledge based on that assumption.

In fact i would do so, (as i'm not an atheistic materialist, i'm a very theistic materialist...)

I have can easily criticize them. I can state that i do not wish to live in a world where people adopt their point of view, and start lobbying against them. I can criticize them based on my dislike for their point of view. ANY worldview can criticize another. They are all on equal footing in that they are based on (limited) human assumptions (even if some people think their assumptions are derived from the supreme being or even from supremely obvious assumption)

@spyman, yes, the laws of physics assume first that tomorrow will be the same as today. So that's the same circular logic i just berated theists for making.

You just can't see it in this case.

My point is that we *can* assess the probability that the sun will rise tomorrow based on what we *know*. We can be almost certain the sun will rise tomorrow. If everything speaks for the idea and nothing against it, we call that true. We do this all the time and it is very effective. As our knowledge changes we can reassess the probability. But I think this described as a Bayesian approach to probability rather than a frequentist approach to probability.

Also I am not so sure that it is a circular argument to say that physics tells us the sun will rise tomorrow. Someday physic tells us the sun will not rise. How is this circular?

with 'no reason supporting an atheist's belief that tomorrow WILL be the same as past days'

you can make an assumption that tomorrow will be like today. And then build some laws of physics on that.

you can't say, well i know the laws of physics are true thus i know tomorrow will be the same as today - without first assuming that all of the assumptions made to derive the laws of physics are true...

one of those assumptions is that an experiment done today, under the right conditions will have the same result tomorrow.

which is exactly circular.

"My point is that we *can* assess the probability "... only if you use inductive logic, which may be wrong.

@orathaic,

Sorry if I've been consistently using "you" in reference to atheism. I have tried not to, but I have probably slipped into it, since you're semi-defending its coherency in this debate. I realize (now anyway) you're more of a skeptic/theist/something else. Of course, that doesn't change the argument. I hope you'll forgive the rhetorical laziness of the "you," anyway.

"nice piece of circular logic there."

You're quite right, it is. But of course, knowledge must ultimately rest on some kind of circle, else it would have to rest on an infinite regress (you don't believe in knowledge, of course).

The distinction between this and an atheistic position is that there IS no coherent circle for an atheist. Just distinct beliefs that don't fit together. The Christian world view is coherent (at least), precisely because it is circular. Assume it once, and it all makes sense. You can explain how you know what you know, how you know it, everything.

An atheistic worldview, on the other hand, can not. If an atheist wishes to assume that his intuitions about tomorrow (induction &c) are correct, he can't even begin to say why that might be in light of his world view. They're just bare assertions.

I should also apologize, I guess, for interchanging materialism and atheism. I meant atheistic materialism whenever I used it. I'm not familiar with your brand really. Would love to hear more about it.

"Your assigning of probabilities without knowledge is without rationality at all."

That's what probability is -- when you have knowledge, you don't need probability (though knowledge may allow you to do better estimates, obviously, than the uniform distribution I'm attempting). But hey, I'll give you this. It's true that you don't really have a handle on the distribution -- it's totally unknown. That just goes to why there is no basis for treating induction as knowledge, though (in this world view).

Yes, you're quite right of course that you can criticize them -- sorry. I should have said, you can't criticize their epistemological method. But apparently you don't want to. My bad.

"but if my one is not true then not other algorithm can be distinguished from the other, thus i have no way to choose between them. This is precisely the point i'm trying to get at."

You keep asserting that, but it's simply not true. YOUR algorithm can't be distinguished from any other either, rationally. We agree about all of them but one, seemingly. You can choose arbitrarily just fine -- you're already doing it! You could choose any other one, too. (Admittedly, this would go against your inborn nature / desires, but those don't say anything about truth either).

But honestly, I'm very interested in hearing more about your views. Probably part of the reason we've been talking past each other is that I've been arguing with you as though you subscribed to a set of beliefs and perspectives that you actually don't. So it might be best to ask what you do subscribe to before proceeding. Sorry for this rather large oversight. (In my defense, my initial statement was directed against a world view, not against you, and it is a valid critique, inasmuch as most adherents of that world view do claim and assume actual knowledge).

@spyman, as orathaic points out, the laws of physics are all contingent on assuming a regular universe. What if the laws of physics all stop working tomorrow? You can't cite "the laws of physics" as a reason that won't happen -- that's where the circularity would come in.
Well, we're just using "the sun rising" as more or less a convenient proxy for that longer-to-describe situation.

"only if you use inductive logic, which may be wrong."

Sure if it is found to be wrong but you reassess the probability.

If NASA sends a space probe out to explore the solar system using knowledge of the laws of physics to determine a path which utilizes gravitational slingshots as a method of propulsion is this also circular logic?

"You keep asserting that, but it's simply not true. YOUR algorithm can't be distinguished from any other either, rationally. We agree about all of them but one, seemingly. You can choose arbitrarily just fine -- you're already doing it! You could choose any other one, too."

yeah, i guess i'm going with my intuition on that rather than any logical sense, but as i've said, by intuition it is only by making this assumption that i can make decisions, before choosing this assumption i can not.

'In my defense, my initial statement was directed against a world view, not against you, and it is a valid critique, inasmuch as most adherents of that world view do claim and assume actual knowledge'

i don't know about most. I would have always called it something like 'assumed knowledge'/'practical knowledge' with knowledge being the common contraction. (where it is practical to assume such beliefs are knowns)

But as a sceptic i recognise there is no knowledge. Just what we assume.

on the other hand, you assumed i held a certain set of beliefs, i was at least trying to argue that i held those same beliefs.

meanwhile... "Just distinct beliefs that don't fit together."

how do you measure how well the beliefs fit or do not fit together?
I mean, if you happen to be christian and believe the bible is the word of god. Then you have some fairly simple set of beliefs, but then you can analyse the bible and find logical inconsistencies and conclude hat something was wrong with your basic premise, or god is illogical. (perhaps you neglected to assume that man wrote the bible and man is fallible, unlike god, and thus the bible is merely a representation of the word of god, not the pure word... )

'If NASA sends a space probe out to explore the solar system using knowledge of the laws of physics to determine a path which utilizes gravitational slingshots as a method of propulsion is this also circular logic?'

no because NASA didn't ask 'how can we know that the sun will rise tomorrow?' or 'how can we know that the universe is regular?'

inductive logic allows us assume that the sun has risen every day i remember, and therefore (by induction) the sun will rise tomorrow.

but it is flawed because it is not necessary for past conditions to be the same in the future.

The laws of physics pre-suppose that this is a valid approach. But nothing in the laws of physics can PROVE that this is the case.

So citing the 'laws of physics' as a justification for this is just as circular as saying:

'we know god is infallible because the bible tells us so. we know this bible is correct because it is the word of god and god is infallible'

@semck83

there is little need to criticize the epistemological basis of christianity. When it comes to what you *should* teach in school, for example, it is fairly simple to put forward an arguement that islam should be taught in schools. (with an islamic worldview as fact) but unless you live in the islamic republic of Iran a majority is unlikely to accept this proposal.

However, if you put forward a scientific worldview as fact, you will find it much easier because this worldview is accepted by a majority in a majority of countries.

There are people here who will specifically defend the fact that christanity is not at odds with science.

Though i would question how enrolment works, i don't know that belief in a soul is necessarily required within a christian context....