I seem to be having trouble getting my point across. I'm pretty sure I know what you mean, but I'll try to condense my points. I think my language and use of terms also added to the confusion.
We don't have free will, at least not free will as you've defined it. My point is that the distinction between free will as you've defined it and the will that we do exercise on a regular basis is not a useful one. I'm not trying to have my cake and eat it too, I'm saying that we don't have cake, but we can eat other things. The distinction has no bearing on the meaningfulness of our lives. For the sake of continuity with my previous posts with outline my reasoning for this, I have called free will as you defined it as "ultimate free will" while the will that we are familiar with I've called "proximate free will".
Now just to address the more recent points.
"My simulation suggestion was a though exercise. I am not suggesting that such a machine actually exists, but for the purposes of discussion we can assume that it could exist, and that is all that really matters."
No, I understand that, but if we're assuming that we're working within the confines of the universe then it's not actually a valid thought experiment. I've already said that I think your point stands irregardless of the validity of this thought experiment, so it's not really a useful point of the argument.
"Also, Chrispminis - does my computer make choices when it just follows its programming? I guess you could say that it does, but they are pretty meaningless since it made a choice when it really had no other options. Heck, maybe it thinks it has free will, but since it has not figured out how to talk to me, I just don't know that it thinks this is the case."
Well, I would say choice is a pretty meaningless concept outside the realm of consciousness. I wouldn't say any of the computers we've built are conscious so I don't think they would subjectively think they had free will. Consciousness is an emergent phenomenon and requires a complexity and integrative network that our computers clearly lack at this point.
"Also, your view of how the spiritual part of our being works I think is a bit removed from what those of us who think this is true believe. Our spirit is in union with our body and is not some foreign entity exercising "executive veto." Rather, our spirit works in unison with our body to take the inputs from the body (which is governed by material rules) and synthesize them with our intellect and will to produce some sort of action. I don't really know how this works, but I don't know how a lot of things work and that does not prevent them from working anyway."
My apologies. However, we may differ fundamentally here because intellect and will I regard as the domain of brain function. It's quite easy to damage a person's intellect and willpower through brain lesions and this is not just a "the cockpit's broken so the pilot can't control the plane properly" sort of phenomenon. People with such lesions are often completely convinced that they have no such deficit, and show no sign that they have some spirit trapped within them that is desperately trying to communicate to the material world. Your argument that it might be possible, just because you can't explain it doesn't mean it's not possible is not really a very good argument for your cause. I could have easily laid back and said I don't know how the material interactions can cause an emergent phenomenon as complex as consciousness and free will, but that doesn't mean it's not possible. In fact, I would say that argument is more valid because it doesn't assume the existence of a spiritual entity that lies beyond all current understanding.
"Finally, the problem with your proximate/ultimate free will argument is that if you really believe that, then you know for a fact that your free will is a complete illusion and that you really don't make choices. If that is the case, how do you live in a seemingly paradoxical state in which you act as though you have free will (and maybe even think you do), but at the same time also believe that you don't have any real free will?"
"Real free will" as it is, does not exist, in the same sense that "real magic" does not exist. I do not have ultimate free will. Nobody does, to the best of current scientific understanding. I do make choices. The things that are deciding are exactly the things that constitute me. These processes and my conscious experience of them are inextricable from each other. I am both subjectively and physically making a decision as far as the word "decision" has any practical value at all as a word. The "decision" that you're referring to does not exist.
You agree that we either have ultimate free will or we do not, right? It doesn't really matter what we believe in that sense, because no amount of belief changes reality. You can't say I believe that I have free will because without it I would not have meaning in my life, and then work backwards to say that this proves that we have free will, correct? Now let's just pretend for a moment that we do not in fact have ultimate free will, which I do not think is unreasonable given that current scientific evidence, which has given us so many boons on the basis of its predictions, does not posit supermaterial interactions.
What then, would you call the regular experience that we have of making decisions? Is it not from this experience that we draw the idea of ultimate free will? It's at least apparent that we have this experience of decision, and this experience is what we call choice. We built our notion of ultimate free will on the basis of this experience, not out of some arbitrary theoretical skyhook. But now we've built this notion, we've knocked out the foundational experience as not "real" or not "actual", when in fact, it is the only thing that we could call choice or decision that *is* real. The theoretical notion is just that, a theoretical notion. It's not an illusion, ultimate free will is the illusion.
I live my life with meaning the same way we all do. It certainly helped that I inherited a lot of faculties from my ancestors that allow me to ascribe meaning to the world around me. My brain constructs my sensory experience in a useful manner such that I can distinguish most things on a similar order of magnitude as I am and I can categorize and recognize various objects. My brain is a powerful correlation detector, such that I can readily discern patterns and tendencies and use them to essentially predict the future. My brain has a powerful executive seat by which consciousness can integrate disparate areas of the brain to create a cohesive experience and through which I can direct and veto the lower areas of the brain. It also helps that I was born into a society of humans already with a fully formed culture with which I can interact and also draw meaning from. My existence is contingent. I was not born with purpose, and I certainly didn't choose to be born, but I consider myself very much priveleged to be given the opportunity to exist. All purpose and meaning I manufacture internally or borrow from what other humans have manufactured internally.